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INTRODUCTION
"The best person to bring up a child is the natural parent. It mat-
ters not whether the parent is wise or foolish, rich or poor, educated or
illiterate, provided the child's moral and physical health are not endan-
gered."' For unwed fathers of infants2 in the United States, this principle
is not readily accepted. Putative father registries and safe haven laws
make it too easy for a state to discard a father's interest in the adoption
of his infant child. Further, when a father has established his interest to
contest the adoption of his infant child, the courts disadvantage the
natural father-child relationship by granting pendente lite custody to
preadoptive parents during the legal proceedings. These statutes and
procedures often do not adequately protect a father's interest in gaining
custody of his infant child. In extreme cases, the statutes violate fathers'
constitutional parental rights by relying on the presumption that unwed
fathers are unfit parents. This assumption attempts to improve expedi-
ency in securing adoptive placements for illegitimate children, which
ultimately denies fathers due process. The Supreme Court has said that
"[p] rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individu-
alized determination"4 and " [ut may be .. .that most unmarried fathers
are unsuitable and neglectful parents. "' But when procedure denies a
determination of the relevant issues of competence and care, "it need-
lessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both
parent and child. It therefore cannot stand."6
This paper argues that states need to strengthen protection of puta-
tive fathers'7 rights to their infant children when the mother wishes for
the child to be adopted. Part I frames the discussion around established
parental rights through constitutional case law. To do this, the paper
addresses both the Supreme Court's parental rights doctrine and its bi-
1. JANE FORTIN, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING LAW 423 (2003) (quoting
Lord Templeman of the House of Lords).
2. For the purpose of this paper, the term "infant" refers to children six months old or
younger.
3. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1154 (7th ed. 1999), defines pendente lite as "[d]uring the
proceedings or litigation; contingent on the outcome of litigation."
4. Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
5. Id. at 654.
6. Id. at 656-57.
7. The terms "putative father" and "unwed father" are not interchangeable. "Putative
father" is the "alleged biological father of a child born out of wedlock." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 623 (7th ed. 1999). "Unwed father" might also be the legal father if he
legitimizes his relationship to his child. Id.
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ology-plus doctrine, which requires unwed fathers to show that in addi-
tion to being the biological father they also have taken responsibility for
their children. Part II describes common state statutes that affect puta-
tive fathers, including putative father registries, safe haven laws, and laws
granting custody of an infant child to preadoptive parents instead of the
father when he contests an adoption petition. Part II also discusses these
statutes' inherent flaws, which violate an unwed father's parental and
due process rights, and suggests ways states can strengthen these statutes
to provide greater protection for fathers. Part III addresses how state
practices implicate poor policy decisions. Specifically, states promote
adoption for illegitimate children even when unnecessary and psycho-
logically harmful, and when federal child welfare policy promotes family
preservation. Part IV adds two more recommendations for how states
can strengthen their protection for unwed fathers: greater compulsion of
mothers' cooperation in identifying the father of their child and better
recognition of the child's interest in being raised by a biological parent.
I. BACKGROUND: ESTABLISHED PUTATIVE FATHERS' RIGHTS
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW
The Supreme Court has said, "[i]t is cardinal with us that the cus-
tody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder."8 The Court gives definition to the
term "liberty" found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it declares "[w]ithout doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to ...
bring up children."9 However, the Supreme Court has infrequently ad-
dressed the complex issue of unwed fathers' parental rights and the
principles that emerge are not as well established or as clearly defined as
the rights of traditional parents.
A. General Parental Rights Doctrine
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court first recognized parents' fundamen-
tal liberty interest in raising their children as they see fit. 1° Specifically,
8. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
9. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
10. Id.
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the Court recognized parents' right to control the education of their
children. In an effort to promote American ideals and identity in all
children reared in the state, Nebraska prohibited the teaching of foreign
languages to children who had not completed the eighth grade." The
Court said that although it is clear the state has the authority to legislate
programs aimed at improving the physical, mental, and moral quality of
its citizens, "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must
be respected."' 2 Those fundamental rights include the liberty to raise
children without arbitrary state interference." In Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, the Court reaffirmed parents' liberty interest in directing the
upbringing of their children by holding that parents have the right to
send their children to any school they wish.
In Prince v. Massachusetts, however, the Court acknowledged that
parental rights are not beyond limitation. 5 The Court upheld Massa-
chusetts's child labor law, holding that the state has a legitimate power to
limit parental freedom in certain circumstances.' 6 In other words, soci-
ety's interest in protecting the welfare of children is sometimes a valid
reason to interfere with parents' rights. The Court found that the legisla-
tive goals to prevent the harms associated with child employment and to
keep children safe trumped the parents' right to control their children's
behaviors. 7 The court explained, "[a] democratic society rests, for its
continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people,"
and it "may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a
broad range of selection."'8
Meyers, Pierce, and Prince established the basic framework from
which the Court later analyzed the parental rights of putative fathers.
The Court did not address the rights of these men until 1972. In the
course of the following decade, the Court delineated the circumstances
in which unwed fathers may assert parental rights over their children.





14. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
15. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
16. Id. at 166-67.
17. Id. at 168-69.
18. Id. at 168.
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B. Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers:
The Biology-Plus Doctrine
In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court first addressed unwed fathers'
rights." Peter Stanley and Joan Stanley cohabitated intermittently for
eighteen years, although they were not married, and had three children
together. When Mrs. Stanley died, Illinois law mandated that the chil-
dren become wards of the state. Without a hearing as to his fitness as a
parent, Mr. Stanley's children were removed from his custody and placed
with court-appointed guardians.2° In Illinois, married (divorced, wid-
owed or separated) fathers and all mothers enjoyed a statutory
presumption of fitness to raise their children and the state was required
to provide a hearing to prove otherwise.2 Conversely, the Illinois statute
presumed unwed fathers were unfit to raise their children and therefore
had no right to a hearing before their children were removed.22 The Su-
preme Court found that this practice violated Mr. Stanley's right to
equal protection,23 explaining "[t]he private interest here, that of a man
in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." 24 The Court
did not question the state's legitimate interest in protecting children;
rather, it reviewed the means by which it pursued that interest. 25 This
case ushered in the doctrine of "biology-plus," which requires more than
a mere biological connection to a child for an unwed father to assert his
parental rights.26
As later cases highlighted, the Court's demonstrated willingness to
protect putative fathers' rights is limited to those men who already have
a relationship with their children and who have provided support for
them.
In Quilloin v. Walcott, the Court underscored this limitation.27 This
case involved an unwed father objecting to his son's adoption by his
stepfather.28 Mr. Quilloin challenged a Georgia law that gave all mothers
19. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
20. Id. at 646.
21. Id. at 647.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 658.
24. Id. at 651.
25. Id. at 649-50.
26. Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination in
Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM. J. GiNDER & L. 222, 229 (2003).
27. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
28. Id. at 24 7.
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and married fathers the authority to consent to an adoption, but denied
such power to unwed fathers unless they legitimized their relationship to
their children.29 The Court focused on how differently situated Mr.
Quilloin was from Mr. Stanley by highlighting the fact that Mr. Quil-
loin never had custody of his son, did not want custody, that he
provided only sporadic financial support throughout his son's eleven
years, and that he had not attempted to legitimize his relationship to his
son prior to the adoption petition. The Court found, under these cir-
cumstances, that this statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because an unwed father who had not
legitimized his relationship to his child nor provided consistent financial
and emotional support for his child is distinguishable from a once mar-
ried, but now divorced or separated father, and therefore the state may
32treat them differently." Consequently, the Court granted the adoption.
A year later, the Court granted certiorari to a very similar, but distin-
guishable case. In Caban v. Mohammed, the Court reviewed a New York
statute that again gave unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, veto
power over adoption petitions.3 In this case the children's stepfather
petitioned for adoption. The biological father objected and the step-
mother cross-petitioned for adoption. 4 The mother successfully vetoed
the stepmother's petition, but the father did not have similar power to
veto the stepfather's petition.35 Mr. Caban differed from Mr. Quilloin
because he lived with the unwed mother for some years, held himself
out to be the father, and provided consistent support for his children,36
which are the factors the Supreme Court says establish an unwed father's
parental rights to his children.37 These facts put the unwed mother and
father on equal footing, which required the state to treat them equally.3
The Court then proceeded to look at the state's use of gender in distin-
29. Id. at 248-49.
30. Id. at 250-51, 254-56.
31. Id. at 256. Before reaching the equal protection issue, the Court found that the stat-
ute did not violate due process principles. Even though there was no finding that Mr.
Quilloin was an unfit father, the State may legitimately use a "best interest of the
child" standard to make adoption decisions when the countervailing interests are
more substantial, such as the maintenance of an intact family unit, as in this case. Id.
at 255.
32. Id. at 256.
33. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 389.
37. See Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
38. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389.
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guishing between unwed mothers and fathers, an issue the Quilloin
Court had reserved. The Court held that the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the distinc-
tion the statute made between unwed mothers and fathers did not bear a
substantial relationship to the state's legitimate interest in finding adop-
tive homes for illegitimate children.39 Further, the Court rejected the
state's claim that there are fundamental differences between mothers'
and fathers' relationships to their children at every phase of develop-
ment, allowing mothers and fathers to be treated differently.0 The
Court said that the stereotypical differences between mothers' and fa-
thers' relationships with a child at the time the child is born diminish as
the child grows older and that these generalizations "would become less
acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child
increased."41
In an attempt to protect the newly recognized rights of unwed fa-
thers, some states instituted a putative father registry where men can
report their biological connection to a child and in return receive notice
of legal proceedings involving that child.42 Lehr v. Robertson is the only
case in which the Supreme Court has reviewed these statutes.43 In Lehr,
an unwed father did not receive notice of the adoption proceeding of his
two-year-old daughter and was denied standing.4  The father was in-
volved with the mother during the pregnancy and birth but his name
did not appear on the birth certificate, he did not provide financial sup-
port, and he never registered on New York's putative father registry. The
father discovered the adoption petition when he filed a paternity action
and sought custody. Although evidence was admitted that suggested the
mother defrauded the father,45 the Court upheld the New York statute
explaining that the putative father registry provided the father ample
opportunity to protect his interest in receiving notice of the adoption
petition and to subsequently have standing in the proceeding. 46 Because
39. Id. at 388, 391. The Court used intermediate scrutiny to review the statute, noting
that gender-based distinctions "must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives" to withstand judicial
scrutiny. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971).
40. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389.
41. Id.
42. See part II infra, for discussion of the weaknesses and strengths of putative father
registries.
43. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
44. Id. at 250.
45. Id. at 251-53, 268-69.
46. Id. at 265.
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the state had a mechanism for putative fathers to protect their interest in
their children, the Court found that the New York statute did not vio-
late Mr. Lehr's due process or equal protection rights when he failed to
register, and the state subsequently granted the adoption of his child
without his consent.47 The Court said that a natural father who grasps
the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child and take re-
sponsibility for her shall enjoy protection of that parent-child
relationship. But, if he fails to grasp that opportunity, the state owes him
no duty to protect his parental rights.
The foregoing cases provide only partial parameters of putative fa-
thers' parental rights. It is clear that a father who has a substantial
relationship with and provides for his child has established his parental
rights." However, the Court has yet to consider whether a father has had
an opportunity to form that relationship with his child; the protection
only begins once he establishes the substantial and supportive relation-
ship. The Supreme Court has never addressed an unwed father's parental
rights to his infant," a situation in which it is difficult for him to estab-
lish a substantial relationship with his child.
II. EXAMPLES OF STATE LAWS THAT ILLUSTRATE THE DE FACTO
PRESUMPTION THAT UNWED FATHERS ARE UNFIT PARENTS
To date, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance to states
on how to properly protect the parental interests of putative fathers. For
that reason, states have enjoyed vast discretion in developing a variety of
strategies ranging from satisfactory protection to failing to provide even
minimum protection for such rights. Unfortunately, too many states
inadequately address the need to protect putative fathers' rights.
The Supreme Court recognizes a state's duty to protect a father's
parental rights to children with whom he has established a substantial
relationship, which means a father must provide regular emotional and
47. Id. at 265-67.
48. Id. at 262.
49. But see, Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that an adulterous
father of a child born to a married woman does not have standing to challenge pater-
nity because tradition dictates that states may protect a unitary family from invasion
of privacy).
50. See In re Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d. 418, 419 (N.Y. 1990) (accepting that a fa-
ther's consent to adoption is needed for children under six months old in certain
situations).
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financial support to the child." But, the Supreme Court has never as-
sessed what a father must do to assert his parental rights to his infant. It
is nearly impossible to establish a substantial relationship with an infant
before the child is surrendered for adoption. Several states look at how
the father treated the mother during pregnancy and childbirth; a father
who has contributed to the financial cost of prenatal care and childbirth,
and supported the mother emotionally during this time may avoid
abandonment charges.52 Although evidence that the father treated the
mother well during pregnancy may be the state's only available measure
to gauge whether a father has grasped the opportunity to parent his in-
fant child, there are too many ways this method may deny a father the
opportunity to develop a relationship with his infant because it relies in
part on the mother's acceptance of his assistance. A mother may refuse
help from the father and bar him from her life during this time. She
may hide the pregnancy from him or tell him that the child is not his.
In these cases, when the mother surrenders her infant for adoption, the
father is not able to provide the court evidence that he has taken respon-
sibility for his child.
Some states already recognize a putative father's liberty interest in
his opportunity to establish a relationship, regardless of whether he is
successful. In Smith v. Maloufi Mississippi's Supreme Court held that a
father who attempts to establish a relationship with his child, but is
thwarted by the mother, should nonetheless have his constitutional pa-
rental rights protected." In In re Clausen, a Michigan court concluded
that it is "now clearly established that an unwed father who has not had
a custodial relationship with a child nevertheless has a constitutionally
protected interest in establishing that relationship."54 The New York
Court of Appeals asserted in In re Raquel Marie X,
In the case of a child placed for adoption at birth, the father
can have no more than a biological connection to the child,
there having been no chance for a custodial relationship. Pro-
tection of his parental interest would depend, then, upon
51. See part I.B. supra, discussing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on putative fathers'
rights.
52. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.032(19) (2005); IOWA CODE § 600A.8 (2001 & Supp.
2006); W. VA. CODE § 48-22-306 (2004 & Supp. 2005).
53. 722 So. 2d 490, 497 (Miss. 1998).
54. 502 N.W.2d 649, 664 (Mich. 1993) (affirming the Iowa trial court).
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recognition of a constitutional right to the opportunity to de-
velop a qualifying relationship with the infant."
The court went on to conclude that "such an interest must be recog-
nized in appropriate circumstances," such as when a mother has
effectively prevented the father from establishing a relationship with his
child.56 The Supreme Court has not affirmed that a putative father has a
right to the opportunity to establish substantial relationships with his
children, as well as rights to children with whom he has already estab-
lished such a relationship. As a consequence, common state practices
involving putative father registries, safe haven laws, and grants ofpendente lite custody to court-appointed guardians violate putative fa-
thers' rights to due process and equal protection by not providing
adequate protection for men who wish to parent their infant children.
A. Putative Father Registries
Enforcing putative fathers' rights to participate in the rearing of
their children can be difficult because mothers inherently have superior
knowledge and control. Mothers may choose not to tell the father he has
a child or may lie to him by telling him the child is not his. Mothers
may refuse to name the father on the birth certificate or refuse any sup-
port he may offer. Putative father registries ("PFR") are popular legal
devices that states implement to counter this dilemma. Upheld by the
Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, PFRs provide a putative father with
a means to protect his rights to his child, independently of the mother's
actions.57 PFRs allow fathers to register with the state and claim that
they are, or even that they suspect they are, the father of a child. Regis-
tration guarantees a father that his child will not be adopted without the
state providing him notice of the proceedings. Specifically, registration
grants a father standing in an adoption proceeding involving his child,
55. Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d at 424.
56. Id. at 419-20 (concluding that the New York statute requiring that the father live
with the mother in the six months preceding adoption placement, which requires a
mother's cooperation, neither furthers a legitimate state interest nor adequately pro-
tects the father's interest); see also MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 70 n.19 (2005) (stating that other jurisdictions that recognize a
father's interest in the opportunity to form a relationship with his child are Illinois,
District of Columbia, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia).
57. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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allowing him to argue for what he thinks is in the child's best interest. 8
The state considers a father who takes the time to register to have taken
positive action to protect his relationship with his child and for that rea-
son his parental rights are worthy of certain protections.
In contrast, failure to register under the requirements of a state's
statute often means the state owes no duty to the father to protect his
parental interests. Thirty-two states have adopted PFR statutes." Al-
though there is great variation in each state's statute, the most common
legal consequence for a father who does not register in compliance with
statutory requirements is that he will not be notified of an adoption
proceeding or his parental rights will be terminated without a hearing. 6°
Twenty-two of the state statutes assert that a father's failure to register
repudiates his right to notice of adoption proceedings and denies him
standing. Such consequences effectively empower the court to approve
an adoption petition without the father's knowledge or consent. Further,
the statutes regard a father's failure to register as prima facie evidence of
unfitness, which a court may use to terminate a father's rights.61 Essen-
tially, in the majority of states with PFRs, an unregistered father is
considered uninterested in his child and thus, unfit as a parent. More
significantly, because PFRs enjoy judicial backing,62 states use PFRs to
efficiently secure the adoption of illegitimate children by expeditiously
discarding the father's rights in the matter.63
These statutes rely on two faulty assumptions. First, states assume
that putative fathers know the registry exists and understand the re-
quirements of proper registration. Most statutes have a deadline by
which the father must register6' and courts tend to strictly enforce
58. Rebeca Aizpuru, Note, Protecting the Unwed Father's Opportunity to Parent: A Survey
ofPaternity Registry Statutes, 18 REv. LITIG. 703, 705 (1999).
59. Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 I-L v. J.L. &




62. See Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (holding that putative father registries are a constitutional
means for a state to protect a father's interest in his child). State courts also echo
Lehr's decision by upholding their state's PFR statutes. See, e.g., In re TMK, 617
N.W.2d 925, 926-27 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); Friehe v. Schaad, 545 N.W.2d 740,
747 (Neb. 1996).
63. Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 705-06.
64. The deadline for registering varies among states. The most common approach is to
specify an amount of time after the baby is born, which is often set at thirty days.
However, the deadline may be as soon as five days after the baby is born or may be
any time up until an adoption petition is filed. Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 716 (sur-
veying state putative father registries); Beck, supra note 59, at 1040.
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them.65 Ignorance of the law is commonly rejected as a reason to reverse
legal consequences. 6' However, in this instance a man may be denied his
fundamental right to parent his child based on his failure to meet a legal
technicality.
Although these statutes intend to provide an unwed father a means
to protect his parental rights, they have the potential to fail. A putative
father who has established a substantial relationship with his child and
provides support for her-conditions the Supreme Court says estab-
lishes an unwed father's parental rights to his child-may nonetheless
lose those rights without a hearing if he is simply unaware of the state's
requirement to register on its PFR. For example, in In re Adoption of
Reeves, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling that
despite the fact that the putative father had established a substantial rela-
tionship with his son, the father was not entitled to notice of, or to
standing in, the adoption proceedings since he failed to register on the
PFR.67 The father was previously married to the mother, but the couple
was divorced at the time of conception and the birth of their second
son.6' Although his name was not on the birth certificate, the man held
himself out to be the boy's father and regularly visited him during the
times he had visitation with his older son from the relationship. 69 When
the boy was about three years old, the mother remarried and consented
to his adoption by her new husband. The putative father did not receive
notice of the adoption because he did not register on the PFR and be-
cause the mother lied on the petition and said the natural father was
unknown.70 In its decision, the Court quoted Lehr's conclusion that:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers
the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses
to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that
opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
65. See Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 716-20 (detailing the different time constraints states
impose on fathers and how courts have interpreted them).
66. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983) (stating that the fact that a man may
fail to register due to ignorance of the law cannot be a valid criticism of the statute and
that there are countervailing interests that support this policy: avoiding more compli-
cated adoptions, avoiding injuring the privacy interests of the mother, and impairing
the finality of adoptions); In re S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606 (Ark. 1988); In re Appeal in
Maricopa County, 876 P.2d 1137 (Ariz. 1994); Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d
99 (N.Y. 1992).
67. 831 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Ark. 1992).
68. Id. at 607.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 609.
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child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the
child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitu-
tion will not automatically compel a State to listen to his
opinion of where the child's best interests lie.71
The trial court in Lehr found that the father had not established a
substantial relationship with his child, therefore the Supreme Court held
that the New York PFR statute was an adequate mechanism to protect a
father's rights.72 In Reeves, however, the court acknowledged that Lehr
did not assess the New York PFR system for its constitutional adequacy
in terminating the rights of a father who had developed a relationship
with his child.73 Nonetheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court declined to
address that issue and upheld the PFR statute and the adoption deci-
sion, which consequently left a father who had grasped his opportunity
to develop a relationship with his son without any legal parental rights
to him.74
Legal reality is that a mother may consent to the adoption of her
child without the court notifying the biological father if he did not reg-
ister, despite the fact the he has established himself in the child's life, and
therefore has a right to due process before his parental rights are termi-
nated. Some argue that better publicity of and accessibility to the
registry requirements would mitigate these problems.7" A public aware-
ness campaign and simplification of forms will not change the fact that
legally unsavvy men who still fail to register may have their parental
rights terminated without due process even if they have established a
relationship with their child.
The second assumption states make is that men know when they
have a child. Almost universally, states place the onus on the father to
determine if sexual intercourse results in pregnancy even though a
mother can easily mislead a man into thinking the child is not his.76
This requirement fits with the underlying policy of PFRs to place the
burden upon the father to protect his own rights. However, men are
71. Id. at 608 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983)).
72. Id. at 609.
73. Id. Because the father challenged the trial court's interpretation of Lehr and did not
directly challenge the constitutionality of Arkansas's statute, the court did not address
that specific issue.
74. Id.
75. See Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 727-28; Beck, supra note 59, at 1038.
76. Beck, supra note 59, at 1062-63; Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 725-26. See, e.g., In re
RFF, 617 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
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disadvantaged in their access to truthful information and women have
the unique capability of denying a man his rights to his child.
Proponents of PFRs argue that the man does not need to know whether
or not a sexual encounter produced a child; he may register on the mere
possibility that he has a child. 7 This premise faultily relies on the first
assumption being true-that men know a PFR exists. And, even if a
father does register, there is no interstate-connected or national registry;
a mother can easily avoid a father's involvement in her adoption decision
by simply going to another state.7" There is a growing consensus that a
mother who consents to an adoption should be compelled to disclose
who the father or potential fathers are, except in cases of rape, domestic
violence, or incest.79 I discuss the arguments for this proposal in part V
infra.
Some PFRs adequately protect a putative father's interest in his
child when states use them in conjunction with other notice require-
ments, such as publication of adoption proceedings, and when failure to
register does not automatically terminate a man's parental rights." But,
PFRs inadequately protect a father's interests when they are a state's sole
means of doing so. States should forgive a putative father for not regis-
tering if he can show that he was unaware of his infant child through no
fault of his own and that once he became aware he took immediate ac-
tion to assert paternity." For example, Illinois softens its PFR
requirements by exempting a putative father from registry deadlines if
he can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was not his fault
that he did not register and that he took immediate steps to file once he
could.82 If a father never intended to relinquish his parental rights and
cannot be faulted for failing to register, then he should not summarily
be penalized. 3
When a state employs a PFR as one of several ways it provides pro-
tection to the interests of putative fathers, PFRs become an important
tool in balancing the interests of all the parties involved in adoptions.
They allow a father to gain equality in enforcing his parental rights by
77. See id. at 1051 (quoting M.V.S. v. V.M.D., 776 So. 2d 142, 151 (Ala. Civ. App.
1999)).
78. See Beck, supra note 59 (arguing the need for a national PFR system).
79. See Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 728-30; Stacy Lynn Hill, Note, Putative Fathers and
Parental Interests: A Searchfor Protection, 65 IND. L.J. 939, 958-59 (1990).
80. See Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 716-720.
81. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 56, at 72.
82. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 2 .1(g) (2004). However, Illinois makes no exception for
lack of knowledge of pregnancy or that child was his. Id.
83. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 56, at 73.
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affording him an opportunity to assert those rights regardless of the
mother's actions. They also serve to secure adoptions efficiently. When a
father fails to register and respond to notice, the state may proceed
without his involvement. He is much less likely to challenge that deci-
sion successfully because the state has protected his constitutional right
to due process. Consequently, adoption decisions are more likely to be
permanent.
B. Safe Haven Laws
Safe haven laws allow one parent (read: mother) to anonymously
and unilaterally abandon her infant child at a designated safe location
such as a hospital or clinic, without the fear of being criminally prose-
cuted for abandonment. The purpose of these statutes is to reduce the
risk of babies being abandoned in a way that would lead to injury or
death and to give mothers a safe alternative when they feel they have no
other option. As an incentive to abandon her child safely, a mother re-
ceives either immunity from prosecution or an affirmative defense
against abandonment charges.
Typically, safe haven statutes detail where a baby may be left, who
may leave the child, in what timeframe a baby may be abandoned with
immunity, and what procedures must be taken after a baby is aban-
doned.84 All of the statutes provide for the anonymity of the person
dropping off the baby, either explicitly or through omission of a re-
quirement to disclose identification.85
Today, forty-six states have safe haven laws.86 Many of these laws
were adopted hastily after a few high-profile national cases of "dumpster
babies" in the late 1990s and are not well thought out.87 The universal
acceptance of anonymity prevents states from effectively protecting the
parental interest of the nonabandoning parent. In reality, that parent is
the father. PFR searches and notice attempts are futile if there is no
84. See Dayna R. Cooper, Note, Fathers are Parents Too: Challenging Safe Haven Laws
with Procedural Due Process, 31 HOPSTRA L. REv. 877 (2003), for specifics and criti-
cisms of each of these conditions.
85. Id. at 882-83.
86. Carole Heath & Anita Catlin, American Alternative to Unwanted Infants, PEDIATRIC
NURSING, May/June 2005, at 229. Texas, in 1999, was the first state to pass a safe
haven law. Cooper, supra note 84, at 879.
87. Cooper, supra note 84, at 877; Tanya Amber Gee, Comment, South Carolina's Safe
Haven for Abandoned Infants Act: A "Band-Aid" Remedy for the Baby-Dumping "Epi-
demic" 53 S.C. L. RFv. 151, 161-62 (2001).
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information about the mother or the baby. With no mechanism left for
the state to attempt to contact the father, the father's right to due
process, before the state terminates his fundamental right to parent his
child, will be violated. To date, no court has addressed this problem with
safe haven laws.
This collective oversight of failing to protect fathers' rights in these
politically popular statutes indicates a societal apathy to fathers' interests
and an acceptance of the presumption that they are unfit parents and
uninterested in their children. Safe haven laws not only deprive fathers
who do not know they have a child an opportunity to find out, but also
deny men who know they are fathers and have taken affirmative steps to
parent (such as providing prenatal financial and emotional support to
the mother) their right to due process.
The irony of these statutes is that they are very unlikely to prevent
the types of abandonment that triggered their enactment. For instance,
one high-profile news story involved an eighteen-year-old New Jersey
high school student named Melissa Drexler.8 Melissa gave birth in the
bathroom during her prom, strangled the baby, left him in the trash,
and went back to the dance.89 It is hard to imagine that, had a safe haven
law existed in New Jersey at the time, Melissa would have swaddled her
son, left the prom, and safely abandoned him at a hospital or fire sta-
tion. All of the newsworthy baby abandonment stories have similar
elements;9" all were equally unlikely to be avoided if there were safe ha-
ven laws in place.9' Instead, safe haven laws provide an avenue for
mothers who would safely abandon their children anyway, a means to
do so anonymously and without the father's consent.
Just as troubling, there is little evidence these laws affect the deci-
sions made by the women they were meant for. There is little
information on the true number of abandoned babies because counting
the number of babies unsafely abandoned each year is nearly impossible,
since so many are probably never found.9 2 In 1998, the last year for
which statistics are available, it was estimated that 105 babies were un-
88. Debbe Magnusen, From Dumpster to Delivery Room: Does Legalizing Baby Abandon-
ment Really Solve the Problem? 22 J. Juv. L. 1, 2 (2002).
89. Id.
90. See id; Gee, supra note 87, at 161.
91. See Shannon Farley, Neonaticide: When the Bough Breaks and the Cradle Falls, 52
BUFF. L. REv. 597 (2004) (arguing that Neonaticide Syndrome, a collection of com-
mon characteristics of women who kill their babies shortly after birth, should be
recognized by the courts as an affirmative defense and that safe haven laws inade-
quately mitigate this phenomenon).
92. Id.
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safely abandoned in the United States and thirty-three were found
dead." In New Jersey, even after $500,000 was spent on a public aware-
ness campaign, only seven babies were abandoned the year after the safe
haven statute became law.94 There have been only three safely abandoned
babies in Mobile, Alabama since the enactment of its safe haven law."
These early statistics suggest that these statutes do not significantly im-
pact the problem of baby abandonment.
Although proponents argue that these statutes are worthwhile if
only one child is saved,96 there is no evidence that the few women who
have abandoned a child under the safe haven laws would have unsafely
abandoned the child without it. Worse, the anonymity components of
these statutes severely impair the statutes' worth because they violate a
parent's fundamental right. Moreover, there are viable alternatives that
would be more effective toward alleviating the problem and would not
plainly trample the rights of the fathers. More widely available confiden-
tial and free prenatal counseling and medical care for women who feel
the need to hide their pregnancy and want to relinquish their rights to
their babies when born, could mitigate not only the problem of aban-
doned babies, but also the unhealthy conditions in which they are
born.97 Public financing and educational awareness campaigns of such
services, targeted to high risk groups (teenagers, low-income women,
and those already involved in protective services), could have a greater
impact on the problem of baby. abandonment while not systematically
violating the fathers' due process rights. Even if these services are pro-
vided confidentially, if they are conducted in a supportive and safe
environment, women may be more willing to give identifying informa-
tion, allowing the state both to conduct both a PFR search and to
provide constructive notice to potential fathers. If Melissa Drexler was
aware of free and confidential assistance during her pregnancy, it is pos-
sible her son would not have died; rather, he may have been safely
93. Heath & Catlin, supra note 86; Carol A. Docan, She Could Have Safely and Anony-
mously Surrendered Her Newborn Infant Under California Law--Did She Know That?,
4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & Pitc. 15 (2002).
94. Docan, supra note 93, at 24-25. That same year, five babies were abandoned in pub-
lic places. Id. at 24.
95. Farley, supra note 91, at 624.
96. Docan, supra note 93, at 24.
97. See Gee, supra note 87, at 162 (arguing why these women need attention long before
the baby arrives). See generally Docan, supra note 93 (discussing Project Cuddle, a
model of such services); Farley, supra note 91, at 625 (advocating for better preven-
tion strategies). Gee also argues that promoting contraception and improving social
services for single mothers would help alleviate this problem. Gee, supra note 87, at
163-64.
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abandoned, the father's rights could have been constitutionally pro-
tected, and adoption would be more secure if it were the ultimate result.
Since there are several viable alternatives to addressing the problem
of baby abandonment that do not tread on fundamental rights, courts
must find safe haven laws unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has
consistently stated that the state may only intrude on an individual's
fundamental right when there is a compelling state interest and when
the state employs narrowly tailored means to address that interest." De-
criminalizing baby abandonment is a good idea to allow desperate
women to safely abandon their infants, but in doing so states should not
systematically violate fathers' rights.
C. Granting Pendente Lite Custody of
Infants to Preadoptive Parents
Imagine a father who properly registers for his state's PFR and gains
legal standing to assert his parental rights to his infant child in an adop-
tion proceeding where the mother gave consent. That father has only so
far acquired the right to argue what he thinks is in the best interest of
his child. If the father wants custody of his child, he must prove he is fit
to parent her. This is especially true if the father was denied the oppor-
tunity to support the mother during pregnancy and birth.
It is clear that states may treat mothers and fathers of newborn in-
fants differently in terms of proving that they are the biological parent."
Courts recognize that at the time of birth the mother has substantially
contributed to the child's life simply by carrying out the pregnancy,
where a father has had significantly less opportunity to prove his com-
mitment. By the time the child is born the mother has necessarily
98. Compare, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that a state has a
compelling interest in providing educational benefits that flow from a diversified stu-
dent body and that affirmative action, narrowly tailored, does not violate the right to
equal protection); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding
that a state may impose a minimum wage that interferes with an individual's liberty
interest to contract for her labor), with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(denying the state the ability to sterilize women against their wishes and holding that
the right to have offspring is fundamental).
99. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2000) ("Fathers and mothers are not similarly
situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood."); Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 260 n.16 (1983) ("'The mother carries and bears the child, and in this
sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's parental claims
must be gauged by other measures."' (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 308,
397 (1979))).
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invested much more into her parental role; a father, on the other hand,
may have at most contributed to the financial burden and supported the
mother emotionally during pregnancy and birth. Because the mother
and father are, by definition, differently situated, the state may have dif-
ferent requirements for each before it recognizes parental rights."100
Because the father is differently situated than the mother at the
time a mother wants to surrender her infant for adoption, it is reason-
able for states to require more from him than a mere showing of a
biological connection. What is not reasonable, however, is for the court
to grant pendente lite custody to preadoptive parents during the time in
which he is litigating his challenge to an adoption.
Although the father who contests the adoption of his infant likely
did not have the opportunity to meet the conditions under which the
Supreme Court holds that he has parental rights to his child, °1 a father's
biological connection paired with his expressed and acted-upon desire to
raise his child should establish his primary right to custody.' 2 Indeed, he
is the only party with a constitutional right at stake. 03
The practice of granting pendente lite custody of a child to preadop-
tive parents puts the father at a distinct disadvantage to claim his
parental rights and increases the possibility that he is not given custody
of his child despite a court's determination of his parental fitness. The
first months and years of a child's life are critical to her wellbeing. The
caretaker forms a strong attachment with the infant through caring for
his physical and emotional needs on a daily basis.1H Legal proceedings
can take a substantial amount of time; the more prolonged the proceed-
ings, the stronger the infant attaches to her caretaker. Notwithstanding a
determination that the father is fit to parent his child, if a long time
elapses during the proceedings and the preadoptive parents have had
custody, conventional wisdom of what is in the best interest of the child
100. Cf Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) ("The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment... is essentially a direction that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.").
101. See supra part I.
102. See Daniel C. Zinman, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father's Right to Raise His
Infant Surrendered fr Adoption, 60 FoRDHAM L. Rav. 971 (1992) (highlighting the
problems with granting pendente lite custody during proceedings involving the adop-
tion of a newborn and a father who wants to veto it, and arguing that courts should
grant putative fathers custody of their children to give meaning to fathers' constitu-
tional right to raise their children).
103. Id. at 996.
104. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRI-
MENTAL ALTERNATIVE 11 (1996).
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could influence the court to nonetheless grant a petition for adoption.' °'
It has long been understood that removing a child from the only home
and caretaker she has known is extremely traumatic and should only
happen to keep the child safe. 0 6 The potential trauma is so grave that to
avoid it, courts may decide the child shall remain with her nonparental
custodian rather than transfer her to her biological father in order to
uphold his constitutional rights.
In essence, by granting pendente lite custody to a preadoptive fam-
ily, the state may predetermine which party will prevail. 1°7 This practice
unfairly reduces the state's burden in determining a father's rights. How
is a father supposed to show the court he is a fit parent when he is not
given the opportunity to care for his child? If a father had pendente lite
custody, he would be able to provide the court with direct evidence of
his fitness."" Without it, the court might depend on speculation and
conjecture to make its determination, making it less likely that the fa-
ther will overcome his burden in a court that uses a best interest of the
child standard. If a father appeals a decision against him, the proceeding
drags out even longer, further decreasing his chances of success.
A more alarming concern is having the infant child bond with pre-
adoptive parents throughout lengthy legal proceedings only to be
removed from the only home she knows when the court finalizes a deci-
sion to return her to her biological father. This precise scenario played
out in front of a national audience twice in the 1990s. The first case in-
volved Baby Jessica, a girl born February 8, 1991, whose unwed mother
placed her for adoption two days after her birth.'09 The mother lied
about the identity of the father on the adoption form and a false father
signed consent to release the baby for adoption. About a month later,
the mother told the biological father, Daniel Schmidt, about his daugh-
ter and he immediately filed an affidavit of paternity on March 12,
1991. This is the moment where the court could have avoided the
trauma Baby Jessica endured. Instead of quickly establishing Schmidt's
paternity and granting him pendente lite custody during his challenge to
105. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that a state may legiti-
mately use a best interest of the child standard to make adoption decisions); In re
P.G., 452 A.2d 1183, 1184 (D.C. 1982) (holding that ordering adoption over the
objection of the natural parent, and without a determination that the natural parent
was unfit, was constitutionally permissible if it was the "least detrimental available al-
ternative").
106. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 19.
107. Zinman, supra note 102, at 996.
108. See id. at 998.
109. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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the adoption petition, the trial court did not hear the issue of paternity
and wrongful termination of parental rights until November 4, 1991, a
full seven months later."0 In all, two and one-half years passed during
the litigation. Meanwhile, Baby Jessica was living with preadoptive par-
ents and developing psychological bonds with her daily caretakers. The
trial court, using a purely legal analysis of the statutory language, found
that Schmidt had not abandoned his daughter and therefore his parental
rights remained intact."' After failed appeals in Iowa," 2 Michigan," 3 and
the U.S. Supreme Court, the preadoptive parents were forced to surren-
der two-and-one-half-year-old Baby Jessica to her biological father-a
man she had never met.
Simultaneously, a very similar story was unfolding in Illinois. Baby
Richard was born March 16, 1991."1 Four days later, his mother con-
sented to his adoption and falsely claimed that the father was
unknown." 6 The mother told the father that the baby had died; he dis-
covered the truth fifty-seven days after the mother consented to the
adoption and immediately began proceedings to challenge the adop-
tion."7 The Illinois Supreme Court stated, "[w]hen the father entered
his appearance in the adoption proceedings 57 days after the baby's birth
and demanded his rights as a father, the petitioners should have relin-
quished the baby at that time.""' Instead, Baby Richard remained with
preadoptive parents during the four-year long litigation."9 As with Baby
Jessica, Baby Richard, who was no longer a baby, was removed from the
only home he knew and placed with his biological father. 2
In both the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases, the preadoptive
parents argued that the courts should use a best interest of the child
standard to decide the custody battle.'' This conflict of interest between
110. Id.
111. See In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Mich. 1993) for a detailed procedural
history of this case.
112. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992).
113. In re Clausen, supra note 111, at 691.
114. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993).
115. Scott A. Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: Defining the Rights of Unwed Fathers
in Newborn Adoptions, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 363, 371 (1996) (citing In re Doe,
627 N.E.2d 648 (IUl. App. Ct. 1993)).
116. Id.
117. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994).
118. Id. at 182.
119. Id.
120. Resnik, supra note 115, at 375.
121. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d
at 182.
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the father's parental rights and the child's best interest is not intrinsic to
the father-child relationship; rather, it was created by the practice of
granting pendente lite custody to the preadoptive parents. The Iowa Su-
preme Court ruling in the Baby Jessica case stated that deciding cases
solely on the best interest of the child without regard to parental rights
in adoption cases leads the court to engage "in uncontrolled social engi-
neering." 122 The court went on to say, "this is not permitted under our
law; 'courts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding
another home appears more advantageous.' ,,123
The unwed father's parental rights only conflict with his infant's
best interests after the state has granted pendente lite custody to the pre-
adoptive parents.124 The Supreme Court has not "embraced the general
proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone." 25 Granting
pendente lite custody to preadoptive parents is a no-win situation for fit
putative fathers and their children. If courts use a best interest of the
child standard, and decide to grant adoption petitions despite a showing
that the biological father is a fit parent, the father is injured by being
denied the opportunity to enjoy his child, and the child loses a connec-
tion to her biological ties. If courts enforce a father's parental rights
using a purely legal analysis, the child suffers the trauma of being re-
moved from her attachment figure. Either way, these conflicts can be
avoided by granting pendente lite custody of an infant child to the inter-
ested unwed father.
What if a father is given custody of his infant child during his chal-
lenge to an adoption petition and the court later determines that he is
unfit? The reverse scenario of the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard stories
would result, and a child who has formed a psychological bond to her
caretaker would be removed from the only home she knew. Neverthe-
less, this is what the child welfare system does everyday. The benefit
comes from protecting the party with a constitutional right at stake and
from assuming that an unwed father is a fit parent. Like in other child
protection cases, the state should have to substantiate claims of unfitness
and provide clear and convincing evidence to the court before his rights
are terminated.2 2 As one scholar noted, "[u]ntil state legislatures grant
an unwed father custody of his infant while his parental rights are being
122. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992).
123. Id. (quoting In re Burney, 259 N.W. 2d 322,324 (Iowa 1977)).
124. Zinman, supra note 102, at 996.
125. Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972) (citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969)).
126. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982).
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determined, the judicial system will provide little more than lip service
to protecting his constitutional rights."'
127
III. IMPLICATIONS OF BAD POLICY DECISIONS
Unquestionably, the state has an interest in efficiently securing
permanent placements for infants. 12 In Stanley, the Court acknowl-
edged, "[t]he establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in
constitutional adjudication.' ' 29 The Court then qualified that statement
by saying, "[biut the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed
and efficiency.' 130 Indeed, the "rights to conceive and raise one's children
have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and 'rights far
more precious .. .than property rights.' ,,1 In addition, it is widely ac-
cepted, through statutes3 2 and case law,13 3 that it is in the best interest of
the child to be raised with his biological parent or parents unless there
are grounds for the state to terminate parental rights for gross miscon-
duct.
Many states, in employing strict PFRs, adopting safe haven laws
with anonymity provisions, and giving custody of infants to preadoptive
families during custody disputes, are violating these principles espoused
by the Supreme Court and federal government. States need to strike a
better balance between their interests in finding safe and secure place-
ments for infants while simultaneously protecting the interests of
putative fathers.
127. Zinman, supra note 102, at 1001.
128. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 275 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("The State
no doubt has an interest in expediting adoption proceedings to prevent a child from
remaining unduly long in the custody of the State or foster parents."); Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) ("The State's interest in providing for the well-
being of illegitimate children is an important one."); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647
("Surely, ... if there is delay between the doing and the undoing petitioner suffers
from the deprivations of his children, and the children suffer from uncertainty and
dislocation.").
129. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
132. See infra part II.B.
133. See, e.g., Dickson v. Lascaris, 423 N.E.2d 361, 363 (1981) (stating that the child's
best interest is to be raised by her natural parent).
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A. States Might Unnecessarily Inflict Psychological
Harm on Fathers and Children
Adoption is a vital tool for securing the future of many children.
Unfortunately, it is also statutorily promoted as a solution for illegiti-
mate infants who may have fathers interested in and capable of raising
them. This preferential promotion implies that it is better for a child
born out of wedlock to be adopted into a stranger's family than be raised
by her biological single parent. States prefer adoption for children whose
unwed mothers wish to relinquish parental rights. This is illustrated
through states' use of PFRs as the sole means to discard a father's interest
in the adoption of his child, safe haven laws that allow anonymity to the
surrendering parent, and grants of pendente lite custody to preadoptive
families.
States not only potentially violate putative fathers' constitutional
right to due process when they employ these practices, but also they may
unnecessarily exact psychological harm to both fathers and children.
These practices underscore the fact that states' overemphasized interest
in efficiency overshadows their duty to do what is in the best interest of
children and to not injure the psychological wellbeing of both parents
and children."14
Decades of research show that adoption is psychologically trauma-
tizing to both parent and child. The wound inflicted is sometimes
described as "primal.""' Shirley Darby Howell concludes from her com-
prehensive review of available research:
Many adoptees forever feel a hole in their identities that needs
to be filled, but cannot be. A need to identify the adoptee's
'true identity' and history often haunts even the most well-
adjusted adoptees. It is likely that few legislators or jurists real-
ize that psychological research indicates that the loss
experienced by an adoptee. is more pervasive, less socially rec-
ognized, and more profound than that of death or divorce.6
134. Shirley Darby Howell, Adoption: When Psychology and Law Collide, 28 HAMLINE L.
Rav. 29 (2005).
135. Id. at 38 (citing NANcy N. VEMIER, THE PRIMAL WOUND 21 (1993)).
136. Id. at 43 (quoting in part Kathleen Caswell, Opening the Door to the Past: Recognizing
the Privacy Rights ofAdultAdoptees and Birthparents in California's Sealed Adoption Re-
cords While Facilitating the Quest for Personal Origin and Belonging, 32 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. Rav. 271, 278 (2002)).
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Research indicates that adoption decisions have a lifelong and pro-
found negative impact on the birth mother as well, and although there
is very little empirical evidence involving fathers, the fact that some fa-
thers bring legal battles to assert parental rights is evidence that some do
experience a deep emotional lOSS.137 One study investigating the impact
of adoption on fathers who surrender their children reveals that ninety-
six percent of these men consider searching for their children. 38 The
same study reveals that sixty-seven percent of men who consent to the
adoption of their children do eventually search for them 9 Fathers who
search for their children have an "almost obsessional quality" about their
need to find them. 40 These are men who voluntarily released their chil-
dren for adoption; it can be assumed that the pain is equally penetrating
for men who discover they lost their parental rights unknowingly or in-
voluntarily and who desire to raise their children.
The second half of the twentieth century saw the number of adop-
tions jump dramatically.' Prior to 1950, legislatures and social workers
held the principle that preserving the biological family was a fundamen-
tal social goal. That attitude waned as infant adoption became
systematically expedited by state statutes and by courts' interpretations
that ignored decades of psychological research indicating that "adoption
is profoundly traumatizing not only to the child, but to the parents as
wxell.'
42
This dramatic rise in adoptions is a result of society's recognition of
child maltreatment in the 1960s, the federal government passing the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974,143 and subsequent
legislation addressing the issue of child abuse and neglect. During this
time, states became increasingly involved in protecting children, and
subsequently in terminating parental rights and finding adoptive homes
for children. There is a demonstrated need for adoption; nonetheless,
because of the potential for serious psychological damage, adoption
should be resorted to only after all reasonable alternatives have failed.
44
When a biological father is interested in his infant child, some states
137. Id. at 44-47.
138. Eva Y. Deykin et al., Fathers ofAdopted Children: A Study of the Impact of Child Sur-
render on Birth Fathers, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 240, 244 (1988).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 30 (stating that in 1988, one million children lived in adoptive homes).
142. See id. at 32-36 for a comprehensive review of the history of adoption.
143. MARVIN VENTRELL & DONALD DUQUETTE, CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE 113
(2005).
144. Howell, supra note 134, at 31.
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violate this principle through their inadequate means of protecting his
rights; consequently, children with no need for adoptive families are
nevertheless being placed in them.
Statutes that promote adoption as the best result for illegitimate in-
fants potentially deny that child the opportunity to be raised by a
biological parent and access to her extended biological family. When the
custody of an infant is in dispute, the law "must make a decision based
on a prediction about who, among available alternatives, holds the most
promise for meeting the child's psychological needs."'45 That determina-
tion should consider the psychological importance of knowing one's
biological identity.
B. Looking to Federal Child Wefare Policyfor Preferencefor
Keeping Children with Biological Parents
Federal child welfare policy explicitly prefers that children remain
with their biological families unless there are substantial concerns about
their safety. In 1974, the federal government passed the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 46 its first incentive-based funding statute
aimed at encouraging states to reform their child welfare systems. 47 In
the past three decades, the federal government's influence over state
child welfare practice has steadily grown.'48 In the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980,'"9 Congress first codified its policy that
reasonable efforts must be made to provide services aimed at keeping
children with their families and to prevent states from unnecessarily re-
moving children from their parents. 5° Congress reasserted this policy in
1997 when it passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act ("ASFA"), T'
which clearly promotes family preservation efforts to avoid removing a
child from her parents.
5 2
Congress made clear that in determining if reasonable efforts were
made, "the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern.""'
Many states' inadequate attempts at protecting putative fathers' rights to
145. GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 104, at 6.
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119(c) (1974).
147. VENTRELL & DUQUETrE, supra note 143, at 143-44.
148. Id. at 144.
149. Pub. L. No. 96-272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-629(i) (2000).
151. Pub. L. No. 105-89 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000).
153. Id.
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their infant children suggest that states presume unwed fathers are unfit
parents and children are not safe in their care. It may be true that many
unwed fathers are not interested or not capable of properly caring for
their children. But this is an overbroad assumption that the states use to
circumvent establishing that an individual father is unfit. When the state
is dealing with an infant whose father wants custody, the father is the
only one with a constitutional interest at stake and federal policy explic-
itly prefers that children stay within their biological family if there is no
potential of harm to the child. If the state has no evidence of a father's
unfitness at the time a father contests the adoption of his infant child,
the state should not be allowed to rely on the stereotypical assumption
that all unwed fathers of infants are unfit.
States that employ stringent PFRs or have safe haven laws know lit-
tle about an infant's father at the time a mother surrenders her infant for
adoption. Abandonment is one "aggravated circumstance" which may
relieve a state from its requirement to make reasonable efforts to pre-
serve a family."' Some states use failure to register on a PFR as prima
facie evidence that a father abandoned his child,'55 and it is nearly im-
possible to determine if a father abandoned his child if the baby was
surrendered under safe haven laws. The Supreme Court holds that a
state needs "clear and convincing evidence" to terminate parental
rights. 156 Although abandonment may be a sufficient basis on which to
terminate parental rights, neither PFRs nor safe haven laws provide the
state with clear evidence that a father abandoned his child.
IV. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GREATER PROTECTION
OF UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS
There are many ways in which protection for unwed fathers' paren-
tal rights need to be improved. Several have already been suggested.
States should recognize that unwed fathers have an interest in the oppor-
tunity to establish a relationship with their infant children, which should
be protected, especially if fathers are unsuccessful in establishing a rela-
tionship with their children through no fault of their own. PFRs should
be used not as a sole means to protect or terminate a father's rights, but
should be used in conjunction with other notice requirements. States
154. Id. at § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii).
155. This is the case in Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Utah. Beck, supra note 59, at
1080.
156. 455 U.S. at 748.
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should decriminalize abandonment of infants without allowing for ano-
nymity of the surrendering parent. Courts should grant pendente lite
custody of infants to fathers contesting adoption petitions. And to
strengthen their policies that protect putative fathers' rights, states
should look to social science research indicating that adoption may be
psychologically traumatizing, as well as to federal policy that promotes
preservation of biological connections. In addition, states should require
mothers to cooperate in identifying the fathers of their infants. Finally,
states should recognize that children have an interest in being raised by a
biological parent.
A. Require Mothers to Disclose Identity ofPotential Fathers
The Supreme Court has said that, "[a]bsent special circumstances,
there is no bar to requiring the mother of an illegitimate child to divulge
the name of the father when the proceedings at issue involve the perma-
nent termination of the father's rights., 157 A mother has superior
knowledge about her pregnancy and therefore has the capacity to pre-
vent the father from establishing his right to due process before his
parental rights are terminated, either by not telling him she is pregnant
or misleading him into thinking the child is not his.58 It is not logical
for states to put the complete onus on a father to discover whether or
not a sexual encounter resulted in a pregnancy when the mother can
easily obstruct a father's intent to care for his child. As of today, no court
or statute requires a mother to disclose a pregnancy or the existence of a
child to the father.
159
If states enacted statutes that required a mother to identify the
adoptee child's father, such a statute should receive strict scrutiny in a
court challenge."6 In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, the Su-preme Court specifically addressed the constitutional issues involved
157. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 273 n.5 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
158. See, e.g., In re Reeves, 831 S.W.2d 607 (Ark. 1992).
159. Howell, supra note 134, at 57.
160. The Court applies "strict scrutiny" to legislation that interferes with an individual's
fundamental right. When the Court applies strict scrutiny, it will evaluate whether
there is a compelling state interest behind the statute at issue to justify the interfer-
ence, and whether the state's means to address that interest is tailored so narrowly as
to only interfere with that fundamental right if absolutely necessary. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved
... regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state inter-
est,' . . . and 0 legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake.").
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when a state compels the disclosure of facts from a private party.16 The
relevant issue in Riley was a North Carolina statute requiring charities to
reveal to potential donors the percentage of donations that go directly to
the charitable work. 6 2 The Court said, "[m]andating speech that a
speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the
speech.',63 Therefore, the statute was a content-based regulation of
speech.164 The Court also stated that for the purpose of applying a First
Amendment analysis, there is no difference between compelled speech
and compelled silence; both necessarily comprise the fundamental right
of "freedom of speech."'65 Since freedom of speech is a fundamental
right, the Court gave the "directive that government not dictate the con-
tent of speech absent compelling necessity, and then, only by means
precisely tailored.'
' 66
Applying the analysis in Riley to a possible adoption statute requir-
ing a mother to identify the father of her infant, that statute must serve
a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored. The compelling
state interests include: (1) protecting the putative father's fundamental
rights to the custody and care of his child (including a right to due proc-
ess before his parental rights are terminated), (2) protecting the child's
right to have a relationship with his father, (3) adequately protecting
these rights in the first instance to ensure the legal stability of finalized
adoptions, (4) establishing parent-child relationships as quickly as possi-
ble, and (5) avoiding unnecessary adoptions by diligently investigating
possible familial placements.
Opponents of compelling a mother to disclose the identity of the
father argue that the state has a compelling interest to protect a woman's
right to privacy.67 Some argue that a woman should not have to expose
the personal and embarrassing aspects of her life, especially since having
a child out of wedlock is socially stigmatizing. 68 This argument has been
greatly eroded over the past several decades. Today, nearly one in three
children are born out of wedlock, 69 indicating more social acceptance
161. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
162. Id. at 795.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 797-98.
166. Id. at 800.
167. See Stacy Lynn Hill, Note, Putative Fathers and Parental Interests: A Search for Protec-
tion, 65 IND. L.J. 939, 958-59 (1990).
168. Id.; Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 729-30.
169. Irwin Garfinkel & Sara McLanahan, Note, Unwed Parents: Myths, Realities, and Poli-
cymaking, SoC. POL'Y & SoC'Y 143-50 (2003).
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and little need to protect a woman from social disdain. "° Regardless of
this societal change, mothers have a pure privacy interest in keeping
their personal lives private. The privacy of women's sexual behavior
should be considered a fundamental right. This is why states need to
narrowly tailor statutes that compel a woman to disclose the potential
father(s) of the child she wishes to surrender.
Statutes that would require a mother to disclose the identity of the
father would necessarily be narrowly tailored; the mother is the only
source of accurate information. Florida's 2001 Adoption Act included a
requirement that mothers who wish to have their child adopted must
provide detailed information about the putative father(s). Then, this
information was extensively published. A mother challenged the statute,
contending that it violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy.
The trial court agreed, but found that the state had a compelling interest
in infringing on that right and that no less intrusive means would
achieve the same result.'71 Most state courts uphold a woman's right to
privacy and putative father registries as adequate alternative means to
protect putative fathers' rights to their infant children, 72 but the Su-
preme Court has never addressed the issue.
PFRs, some argue, are a less intrusive means of addressing a state's
compelling interest in identifying infants' fathers. 173 But, as discussed in
part I supra, most PFRs fall short of adequately protecting a putative
father's rights or of providing him due process before those rights are
terminated. And because most states only provide weak and superficial
protection through these registries, the states are not adequately estab-
lishing secure parent-child relationships, either with a biological parent
or adoptive parent. Plus, by employing PFRs in place of requiring
mothers to identify the father, the state establishes a double standard: a
state will not fully protect a father's parental rights by compelling a
mother to disclose his identity, but it will protect a mother's right to pri-
vacy. It appears that infringing on a woman's right to privacy by not
170. Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 729-30.
171. G.P. v. State, 842 So.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The Florida
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's conclusion, but mainly because the
state failed to defend itself in the proceedings, as the legislature was about to repeal
the provision. Claire L. McKenna, Note, To Unknown Male: Notice of Plan for Adop-
tion in the Florida 2001 Adoption Act, 79 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 789, 794, 810
(2004).
172. See, In re S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Ark. 1988); In re Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d
281, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); In re T.M.K., 617 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2000).
173. McKenna, supra note 171, at 811 n.158.
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compelling her to disclose the identity of the father outweighs the state's
multiple other compelling interests.
Lastly, it is suggested that statutes requiring a mother to reveal the
father's identity would result in more abortions and fewer adoptions. '74
Florida's statute requiring mothers' cooperation in identifying the father
was in effect for one year. During that year, there were more abortions
and fewer adoptions than average. 75 But such data is neither conclusive
nor adequate for drawing causal relationships between the statute's effect
and changes in frequencies of abortion and adoption. The idea that
obliging a woman to cooperate in identifying the father will negatively
impact abortion and adoption rates is a theoretical problem and should
not prevent a state from enacting such statutes without empirical evi-
dence.
1 76
Moreover, compelling the mother to disclose the father's identity is
something states already do when a mother applies for welfare assis-
tance. "Cooperative federalism," codified in the Social Security Act of
1974,77 encourages mothers applying for entitlement payments under
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF")' 78 to cooperate in/.a 179
identifying the fathers of their children. States must deduct twenty-
five percent of eligible benefits if the mother refuses to identify the fa-
ther and may deduct more if the state chooses.'80 Other federal statutes
that attempt to persuade mothers to identify the fathers of their children
include Medicaid and food stamps programs. 8 ' Congress adopted the
cooperative model for approving entitlement benefits so that states may
protect themselves against unnecessarily spending money on families
when there is a father who is responsible. Comparing the legitimacy of
these statutes to one that would require a mother to cooperate in identi-
fying the father of the child she is surrendering for adoption, Justice
White opined, "[t]he State's obligation to provide notice to persons be-
fore their interests are permanently terminated cannot be a lesser
174. See McKenna, supra note 171, at 812 n.163; Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 730.
175. McKenna, supra note 171, at 812 n.163.
176. Aizpuru, supra note 58, at 730.
177. Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology 'Plus'
Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 47, 72 (2004) (citing Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1975)).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 601. The program was originally called Aid to Families with Dependent
Children. Id.
179. Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1975).
180. Id. at 2337-38.
181. 42 U.S.C. 608(a)(2) (2003) (requiring cooperation for Medicaid benefits); 42 U.S.C.
1396(k) (requiring cooperation for food stamps benefits).
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concern than its obligation to assure that state funds are not expended
when there exists a person upon whom the financial responsibility
should fall."182
Of course, there are situations where it is not in the best interest of
the child or woman to compel cooperation. The federal statutes make
clear exceptions to the cooperation requirement if the custodial parent
can show good cause,183 which includes cases of rape, incest, and domes-
tic violence. State statutes requiring mothers to identify the fathers of
their surrendered children should include similar provisions.
While it is imperative that the woman and child's safety are para-
mount concerns, the state should provide a countermeasure to dissuade
women from deceiving courts. States should provide for civil damages to
fathers who were wrongly thwarted by the mothers of their children, but
this is an imperfect solution for several reasons. Civil damages often rely
on the opinions of a jury. But, juries may not be sympathetic to the un-
wed father or may easily find the mother's deceptive actions
reasonable.'84 A father may not have the financial means to bring suit or
the woman he wishes to sue may be insolvent. '85 But the threat of this
mechanism would create an incentive for women to seriously consider
the father's rights in the matter and to cooperate with the state to ensure
his rights are protected. Plus, in cases where the child has been in an
adoptive placement for a substantial amount of time when the father
discovers her existence and it is not in the best interest of the child to
remove her, the father is not left entirely without remedy.
Placing the onus on the father to discover whether or not he is the
father is "totally unrealistic.' 8 6 In some cases, it would require a man "to
become involved in the pregnancy on the mere speculation that he
might be the father because he was one of the men having sexual rela-
tions with her at the time in question. '' 187 In other cases, the mother can
hide the pregnancy from him even if he inquires about the possibility of
her being pregnant. Women have control over the situation; men do
not. Greater cooperation from mothers is necessary for states to provide
greater protection for fathers' parental interests.
182. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 273 n.5 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
183. 7 U.S.C. § 2015()(2) (2003) (waiving cooperation requirement for food stamps if
good cause can be shown); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) (2003) (waiving cooperation
requirement for TANF benefits in domestic violence situations if good cause can be
shown).
184. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 56, at 76.
185. Id.
186. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 n.1 (Iowa 1992).
187. Id.
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B. Apply a Child-Focused Analysis to this Controversy
Statutes and courts focus on the legal status of a putative father to
his child: has he met the constitutionally established criteria of biology-
plus that would trigger the state's requirement to protect his interest in
his relationship with his child? Children's interests in their relationship
with their biological fathers is not a factor in the calculus, yet these deci-
sions have a profound impact on their lives and development. Balancing
the father's and child's interests to have a relationship with one another
would be less dismissive Of fathers' legal rights.
Recognizing that children have a liberty interest in familial relation-
ships is an idea that has been gaining support in recent years,"' but the
Supreme Court has yet to formally accept such a proposition. The last
time the Supreme Court had the opportunity to do so was in Michael
H. v. Gerald D. 89 There, the Court stated, "[w]e have never had occa-
sion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with
that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship ... [and] [w]e
need not do so here."' 9 However, a few years earlier, in Pickett v. Brown,
the Court suggested that "an illegitimate child has an interest ... in es-





However, the Court has laid the foundation to recognize a child's
right to maintain a relationship with her family. The Court has recog-
nized that a child is a person for the purposes of the Constitution 92 and
has specifically recognized that minors have a constitutional right to
abortions, contraceptives, and freedom of speech.' 93 Courts have also
recognized that children have a substantive right of companionship with
their parents in the context of wrongful death or separation. 94 In San-
tosky v. Kramer, the Court asserts, "[a]t the factfinding, the State cannot
188. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to
Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358 (1994);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Par-
ents'Rights, 14 Ckioozo L. REv. 1747 (1993).
189. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
190. Id. at 130.
191. 462 U.S. 1, 15 n.13 (1982).
192. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles have a right to due process in
criminal proceedings).
193. Holmes, supra note 188, at 385.
194. Id. at 399-404; Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citing Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 935 (1987)) (extending parents' constitutional interest in their familial
companionship to their children in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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presume that a child and his parents are adversaries, .... [b]ut until the
State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital
interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relation-
ship." 1
95
Further, the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the
Child ("CRC") explicitly identifies a child's right to be with his par-
ents. 116 Specifically, Article 7 declares, "[t]he child ... shall have ... the
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents" and Article 8 de-
clares, "[s] tates ... [shall] respect the right of the child to preserve his or
her identity, including ... family relations.' ' 97 Though the CRC is not
binding on the United States, which has failed to ratify it, 191 other
countries have ratified this convention, which strongly demonstrates an
international consensus around the importance of these rights.
States have reason to condemn out-of-wedlock births, since these
children are often a financial burden on the state. But, as the Pickett
Court stated, "visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is
illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrong
doing."' 98 Although states may want to discourage men from fathering
children outside of marriage by making it difficult to assert paternity if
they do, the child's interest in her relationship with her father counter-
vails that state interest: "Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual as well as an unjust
way of deterring the parent.,'99
The Due Process Clause affords only those protections "so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental." 00 But, "[w]hat the deeply rooted traditions of the country are
195. 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
196. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, 44
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989). ("[T]he most ex-
pansive international treaty that protects children's rights in 191 participating
countries [yet] awaits ratification by the United States. Its consideration by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has been delayed for more than ten years due to proce-
dural and political barriers.").
197. Id. arts. 7, 8.
198. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (discussing a state's interest in not disadvan-
taging illegitimate children by denying them rights to financial support from their
fathers that children whose parents are married enjoy).
199. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
200. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (quoting Snyder v. Mass., 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.)).
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is arguable. ' 20 ' Tradition is too limited a methodology for the court to
fully realize the rights protected by the Constitution. "Liberty [is a]
broad and majestic term[] ... among the great constitutional concepts
... purposely left to gather meaning from experience., 202 Before 1972,
neither tradition nor law recognized putative fathers' parental rights to
the children with whom they established a substantial relationship. 201 It
is time for legal recognition that children have a liberty interest in being
raised by their biological parent and to give that interest its rightful con-
stitutional protection. By doing so, states would have a greater incentive
to protect putative fathers' parental interests when their children are in-
fants.
CONCLUSION
States have an interest in protecting putative fathers' rights. By do-
ing so, they will avoid violating fathers' rights and prevent them from
asserting them later."' Contrary to current belief and practice, strength-
ening the protection of putative fathers' rights to their infant children
would increase efficient administration and expediency because it would
protect the state from legal challenges from fathers who wish to undo
adoption decisions in which their rights were not originally protected. It
is in the best interest of the child to quickly find permanency. For this
reason, the state should provide stronger statutory protection for unwed
fathers' rights-either to promote the bonds of family or to ensure the
stability of adoption decisions. t
201. Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 549 (1977)).
202. Id. at 138 (White, J., dissenting).
203. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (providing a list of cases in which the Court first
recognized fundamental rights, such as the right to use contraceptives, freedom from
corporal punishment in school, and freedom from an arbitrary transfer from prison
to a psychiatric institution); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
204. See Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 275-76 (White, J.
dissenting).

